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The geography of innovation in China and India 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The BRICs, in general, and China and India, in particular, are now widely regarded 
as the areas of the world likely to challenge the economic leadership of the United 
States (US) and the European Union (EU). A large part of this challenge will come 
from a rapid technological catch up by China and India. Yet, despite a recent rise in 
interest, there is still limited knowledge about how and where innovation takes place 
in these two leading emerging countries and to what extent the Chinese and Indian 
territorial systems of innovation differ from those in the EU or the US. In this paper 
we explore the geography of innovation in China and India, concentrating on 
understanding key territorial-level innovation trends by country, region and 
technology field and using the US and the EU as benchmarks. We find significant 
contrasts between the geography of innovation in China and India and that of the US 
and the EU. First, the degree of concentration of innovative activities in both 
countries is extremely high. The agglomeration of innovation in the coastal provinces 
of China and in Delhi and the south of India significantly exceeds levels of 
agglomeration found in the USA and the EU. Second, China has witnessed a more 
rapid increase in the degree of concentration of innovation than India. We posit that 
the differences in the geography of innovation between, on the one hand, China and 
India and, on the other, between these countries and the developed world are rooted 
in different institutional settings, different systems of innovation and different national 
innovation strategies. 
 
Keywords: Innovation, patents, R&D, agglomeration, China, India, United States, 
European Union. 
 
 
  3 
1. Introduction  
  
There has been considerable attention paid to the similarities and differences in the 
territorial dynamics of innovation between the European Union (EU) and the United 
States (US) (e.g. Freeman 2002, Crescenzi et al. 2007, Dosi et al. 2006, Navarro et al. 
2008). The status as the leading innovation and technology hubs in the world 
warranted this attention. However, their position as the most innovative poles is being 
challenged by emerging countries, and specifically by the burst into the scene of the 
BRICS (or even the BRIICS – Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South 
Africa) countries. The growing academic and policy interest in these countries – and 
especially in India and China – reflects their increasing economic importance as well 
as their demographic potential. BRICS countries have rapidly transformed 
themselves, gaining in the process significant economic and political clout. 
Spectacular urbanisation in India, and in particular, China has been the most visible 
symbol of this transmission. India’s cities alone could generate 70 per cent of net new 
jobs to 2030 and by then represent more than 70 per cent of GDP, reflecting urban 
population growth from 290 million in 2001 to 340 million in 2008, and 590 million 
in 2030 (MGI 2010).  Similarly, China’s urban population is expected to increase 
from 636 million in 2010 to 905 million by 2030 (UN Population Division 2010). 
Rapid changes and sustained high levels of growth are likely to make some of the 
BRICS countries – and, fundamentally, China and India – some of the key economic 
players in the near future. China is already the second largest economy in the world 
and catching up quickly with the US. An influential Goldman Sachs report, 
‘Dreaming with BRICS’, suggests that by 2040, China will be the largest economy in 
the world and India the third largest, surpassing those of Japan, Germany, France and 
Great Britain (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003; see also Jacques 2012).  
 
In terms of innovation, the past two decades have seen the globalisation of production 
and the globalisation of R&D (Bruche 2009, Lundvall 2009, Yeung 2009, Fu and 
Soete 2010, Kuchiki and Tsuji 2010). China and India have been at the forefront of 
these shifts (Leadbeater and Wilsdon 2007, Popkin and Iyengar 2007, Parayil and 
D’Costa 2009) and their economic dynamism is increasingly based on endogenous 
innovative capacity, rather than on mass production and cheap labour (Friedman 
2005). Yet, despite the growing economic importance of the BRICS countries and the 
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phenomenal changes in innovation capacity in China and India, very little is known 
about the geography of innovation in these emerging countries. Little systematic 
comparative analysis exists and it has been fundamentally limited to describing the 
major ‘inputs’ for the generation of innovation, such as the quantity and quality of  
innovative efforts or the different levels of human capital accumulation, the structure 
of the educational system and the capacity to attract (diaspora) and generate and retain 
top-level scientists (Winters and Yusuf 2007). Alternatively, research has focused on 
the organisational and institutional settings which shape innovation, the innovation 
systems (e.g. Lundvall et al. 2006, Lundvall 2009), but the analysis of indigenous 
factors and their geography has been more limited, with literature generally based on 
case studies (e.g. Lewis 2007, Chaminade 2010) and, sometimes, on anecdotal 
evidence. By and large, there has been a tendency to assume, in a Rostovian way 
(Rostow 1959), that emerging countries are in an earlier stage of the innovative 
process than the EU or the US and that they will tend to follow a similar path towards 
innovation and development in the future (World Bank 2009). However, this 
assumption flies in the face of the facts that, first, the pace of change currently 
experienced by emerging countries has virtually no parallels in history (Henderson 
2010) and that, second, the territorial dynamics of innovation have been rather 
different also in the EU with respect to the US (Crescenzi et al. 2007). Hence, the 
limited knowledge we have about the evolutionary trajectories of countries such as 
China or India, coupled with the diversity of development and innovation paths trod 
by countries now at the forefront of science and technology, raise numerous questions 
about the territorial dimension of the process of technological development in China 
and India. How have global changes in the production of ideas affected Chinese and 
Indian regions and cities? What role are regions and cities playing in the shifting 
geography of innovative activity? Are China and India going to follow the innovation 
path of the EU or are they more likely to go in the direction of the US? Or will they 
follow their own path and build their own unique systems of innovation? 
 
This paper represents a first exploration the geography of innovation in China and 
India, using the USA and the EU as benchmarks and paying special attention to 
developments at subnational level. In order to do this, in section 2 we look at the 
spatial distribution of the innovative activity, proxied by patents, taking into account 
differences by country, region and technological sectors (ICT, biotech and nanotech). 
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In section 3 we revisit these stylised facts for China and India in light of the main 
theories of innovation and development in order to interpret existing evolutionary 
processes and identify emerging trends. Section 4 presents the main conclusions.  
 
 
2. Innovation in China and India vs. Europe and the US: the broad 
picture in a territorial perspective  
 
2.1. Country-level comparative perspective 
 
The first stage of the analysis involves an overview of the comparative ‘innovation 
performance’ of China and India, using the US and the EU as benchmarks. We first 
focus on patents as the most commonly used, albeit highly imperfect, innovation 
‘output’.1 An important caveat with the use of patent data in China and India is that it 
partly reflects patenting activity by multinational firms (MNEs). MNE patents may be 
filed in any office around the world, regardless of where the invention actually took 
place, making it hard to assign patents to a specific territory (Li and Pai 2010). There 
are close links between foreign firms, MNE clusters and patenting clusters in India 
and China. For example, Duan and Kong (2008), in a study of Chinese patents 1988-
2007, observe that most ‘Chinese’ applications to the USPTO are owned by foreign 
applicants. Da Motta e Alburquerque (2003) suggests similar patterns for India. 
Patenting is also related to firm size. Patenting data over-represents innovations in 
large firms (often located in major agglomerations), while, at the same time, 
underestimating innovation in smaller firms, which also tend to be located outside the 
main centres of innovation. Finally, patenting is bound to significantly under-
represent certain types of innovation, such as process innovation, and incremental 
innovation conducted by generally local firms. However, despite all the imperfections 
of patenting data for China and India – which reproduce the imperfections of 
patenting data elsewhere in the world – lack of alternative and comparable territorial 
data on innovation implies the need to resort to patents as the only suitable available 
                                                 
1
 Our data stem from OECD Reg-Pat PCT Patent Applications, thus avoiding problems that might arise from 
using domestic Chinese or Indian data (Li and Pai 2010, Wadhwa 2010). 
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indicator of innovation while relying on data based on patent applicants' location in 
order to capture the innovative performance of local firms to the maximum extent 
possible.  
 
Using patents as a measure of innovation tends to put the USA as world leader, 
followed, at some distance, in terms of patent intensity
2
  by the EU (Crescenzi et al 
2007). Figure 1 illustrates the evolution in patenting trends in China and India, 
relative to the US and the EU, between 1995 and 2007. The first feature that strikes 
when looking at patent intensity (Figure 1) is that of the gap that still exists between 
the two developed and two the emerging countries. The US and EU have seen their 
patenting activity rise more or less continuously during the period of analysis,  from 
levels of around 61.1 patent applications per million people filed in 1994 in the USA 
(39.7 in the EU-15)  to around 165 per million in 2007 (123 in the EU-15).  
 
China and India during the 1990s invested heavily in innovation ‘inputs’, increasing 
literacy rates and higher education enrolment, raising production of engineering 
graduates and increasing expenditure on R&D. Both countries also began to 
‘globalise’ their economies, facilitating FDI flows, licensing of foreign technology 
and moving students abroad (Dahlman 2010). These efforts translated into rapidly 
rising patenting rates (clearly visible in the corresponding trend lines in Figure 1). 
However, while matching each other during the 1990s, the 2000s witnessed a 
divergence between China and India. Indian patenting started to stall from 2003 
onwards, precisely as China’s patents took off. Between 2000 and 2007 patent 
intensity in China rose fourfold up to 4.4 patents per million inhabitants. By contrast, 
by 2007 patenting in India had not yet exceeded the 0.8 patents per million inhabitants 
threshold (Figure 1).  
 
Despite this non-negligible catch up, in particular by China since 2000, the gap 
between the US and the EU, on the one hand, and China and India, on the other, is 
still considerable. In 2007, in absolute terms the EU filed almost 8 times more patent 
applications than China and almost 39 times more than India. Taking into account that 
this ratio was 156 to 1 with respect to China and more than 2000 to 1 with respect to 
                                                 
2
 The number of international patent applications per million inhabitants. 
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India in 1994, there has certainly been rapid convergence. But rapid convergence does 
not hide the sheer dimension of the innovation output gap between the leading 
developed countries and the leading emerging countries (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1.  Patent Intensity, China, India, USA and EU. 1995-2007 
 
Note: USA, EU27 and  EU15 Primary Axis (Left hand side scale) / China and India Secondary Axis (Right Hand side scale) 
Source: Own elaboration with OECD PatStat data 
 
However, a quick look at the evolution of innovation ‘inputs’ indicates that the 
convergence rate of innovation outputs is not only likely to continue, but to accelerate 
in years to come. The gap in R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP, often 
regarded as one of the key innovation inputs, has been narrowing very rapidly since 
the turn of the century. This is particularly the case between China and the EU. 
Whereas in 1995 R&D expenditure relative to GDP in the EU almost tripled that of 
China, the significant effort made by the Chinese government and firms to catch up in 
R&D expenditure meant that the gap in 2007 was a mere 20% higher in favour of the 
EU (Figure 2 – in this figure data for all countries uses the same axis/scale). The gaps 
in R&D expenditure between the US, the EU and India, by contrast, have remained 
more stable (Figure 2). The comparison of the trend lines between China and India 
confirms the higher R&D dynamism of the former. 
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Figure 2.  Evolution of R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP, China, India, USA 
and EU 1994-2007. 
 
 
The recent evolution of the endowment of skilled human capital in both China and 
India also points towards a greatly enhanced potential to generate new knowledge and 
to assimilate externally generated innovation. The effort put in by both countries in 
order to increase their human capital is starting to pay off. The USA still has 
significantly more graduates than India or China, while the EU considerably trails the 
US, but still has a relevant margin in the endowment of human capital relative to 
China or India (Figure 3). There is evidence, however and especially since 2000, of a 
considerable catch up by the two emerging countries. In particular, in certain 
technological fields the gap is vanishing fast. The number of engineering graduates in 
China (352,000 graduates) and in India (184,000 graduates) already clearly exceeded 
that of the US (76,000 graduates) in the year 2000 (Mitra 2007). The quality of 
graduates has also improved. It is not only that Chinese and Indian universities have 
moved closer to the knowledge and technological frontier, since 2000 China has also 
been sending its best graduates to foreign institutions in droves. In this respect China 
has been more aggressive than India, although Indian returnees have been crucial for 
the development of specific high-tech and scientific sectors in the country, such as the 
ICT sector (Saxenian 2006). The internal effort has also been translated in a particular 
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rise in the number of scientists. China only trails the US in overall number of 
researchers (Schaaper 2009), whereas India’s R&D worker intensity, which rose 
significantly in the 1990s and early 2000s, has somewhat stalled since then.  
 
Figure 3. Population shares with tertiary education. 1994-2007.  
 
 
 
 
2.2. The territorial dimension of innovation in China and India 
 
The country-level comparative perspective hides significant contrasts in how the 
innovative capacity is distributed both within China and India and in how the 
geography of innovation in these two countries differs from that of the US and 
Europe. 
 
Research capacity and innovation are not spread evenly across China and India. 
Indeed, the geography of innovative activity in China and India is territorially very 
uneven. Patent counts at the sub-national level indicate that the five EU regions with 
the highest shares of patent applications together represent 35% of all EU patenting; 
for the US the corresponding figure is about 50%. By contrast, the five most 
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innovative Indian regions cover 75% of Indian patents; in China, the five highest-
patenting regions produce almost 80% of all patent applications.
3
    
 
Both India and China have innovation systems which tend to be significantly more 
spatially concentrated than in the US and, of course, the EU, where the heritage of 
national innovation systems is still evident. China’s innovative capacity is 
concentrated along coastal regions, especially in the larger cities and in the South 
(Sun 2003, Wang and Lin 2008). Our Chinese data find that Guangdong is the leading 
province counting for 46% of total average patent applications over the 1994-2007 
period. The next two are the municipalities of Beijing (14%) and Shanghai (13%). 
The overall system is highly agglomerated, with the top three regions accounting for 
73% of all patents.  
 
In India, patent counts are highest in high-tech clusters such as Bangalore, Chennai, 
Delhi, Hyderabad, Mumbai and Pune (Mitra 2007). At the regional level, da Motta e 
Alburquerque (2003) finds that from 1981-2002, nearly half of all patents to Indian 
inventors are in two states, Maharashtra and Delhi. Our data find that Maharashtra 
(with Mumbai as its capital) and Delhi respectively count for 26% and 24% of total 
average patents. The third is Andhra Pradesh (13%, SE of Maharashtra, capital 
Hyderabad). The top three Indian states account for 64% of all patent counts during 
the period of analysis. One step below are the states around Delhi (Haryana – 7% of 
total patent counts – Punjab4 or Himachal Pradesh) and some of the larger states of 
the South, such as Karnataka (8.7%, capital Bangalore), and Tamil Nadu (7%, South, 
capital Chennai). 
 
The analysis of the geographical distribution of patent counts in the US puts the 
dimension of the geographical concentration of innovation activity in China and India 
into perspective. The US is acknowledged as the world leader on a range of 
innovation metrics and often considered as the epitome of geographically self-
contained innovation systems (Crescenzi et al. 2007). Innovation in the US is indeed 
                                                 
3
 In each case the most appropriate, comparable spatial unit has been selected under the constraint of regionalised 
patent data availability from the OECD – Chinese provinces, Indian states, and, finally, American Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) Economic Areas, as benchmark 
4 Indira Gandhi's raid on the Golden Temple (1984) in Amritsar resulted in a large migration of skilled Sikh 
population which severely dented Punjab’s innovation capacity. 
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geographically concentrated, displaying two important innovation cores along the 
North-East (New England and the eastern part of the Atlantic States) and the West 
Coast (from Seattle to San Diego). However, the rest of the country is far from being 
an innovation desert, as strong innovation hubs can be found throughout the country 
(e.g. Minneapolis, Milwaukee-Madison, Cincinnati, Austin). 
 
This represents a smoother spatial distribution of patents applications in the US than 
in either China or India, as evidenced by Table 1, which lists the twenty most 
innovative regions in China, India and the US in terms of patent intensity. In the US, 
the three leading regions are San Jose-San Francisco-Oakland (Northern California), 
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos (Southern California) and Appleton-Oshkosh-
Neenah (Wisconsin). These three account for only 32% of all patenting, compared to 
73% and 64% shares for, respectively, the leading Chinese and Indian regions. 
Generally, the more innovative regions in the US are located on the Western and 
Eastern seaboards, or the Great Lakes region (Michigan, Wisconsin). Less innovative 
areas are relatively less populated and tend to be confined to the Midwest – and, in 
particular, some of the Western Plain counties – and to the Deep South (Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Alabama and southern Georgia). But even in these areas there are major 
innovation hubs, such as, Austin (Texas), Houston-Baytown-Huntsville (Texas), and 
Denver-Aurora-Boulder (Colorado).    
 
Table 1. Top 20 innovative regions, 1994-2007. 
 China India USA  China India USA 
1 Beijing Delhi San Jose-San 
Francisco-
Oakland, CA 
11 Chongqing Himachal 
Pradesh 
Reno-Sparks, 
NV 
2 Shanghai Haryana San Diego-
Carlsbad-San 
Marcos, CA 
12 Heilongjiang West 
Bengal 
New York-
Newark-
Bridgeport, 
NY-NJ-CT-
PA 
3 Guangdong Chandigarh Appleton-
Oshkosh-
Neenah, WI 
13 Sichuan Kerala Gainesville, 
FL 
4 Tianjin Maharashtra Minneapolis-
St. Paul-St. 
Cloud, MN-
WI 
14 Shaanxi Punjab Seattle-
Tacoma-
Olympia, WA 
5 Zhejiang Andhra Boston- 15 Jilin Uttar Boise City-
  12 
Pradesh Worcester-
Manchester, 
MA-NH 
Pradesh Nampa, ID 
6 Fujian Karnataka Cincinnati-
Middletown-
Wilmington, 
OH-KY-IN 
16 Hainan Jharkhand Chicago-
Naperville-
Michigan 
City, IL-IN-
WI 
7 Jiangsu Goa Rochester-
Batavia-
Seneca Falls, 
NY 
17 Hubei Rajasthan Houston-
Baytown-
Huntsville, 
TX 
8 Liaoning Gujarat Austin-Round 
Rock, TX 
18 Shanxi Madhya 
Pradesh 
Hartford-West 
Hartford-
Willimantic, 
CT 
9 Shandong Tamil Nadu Philadelphia-
Camden-
Vineland, PA-
NJ-DE-MD 
19 Inner 
Mongolia 
Jammu & 
Kashmir 
Raleigh-
Durham-Cary, 
NC 
10 Hunan Pondicherry Albany-
Schenectady-
Amsterdam, 
NY 
20 Xinjiang Orissa Santa Fe-
Espanola, NM 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD data 
 
In China, as we have seen, the leading regions for innovation tend to be in coastal 
areas. Outside these regions, very few provinces account for more than 1-3% of total 
patenting. These are fundamentally other coastal provinces (e.g. Fujian, Liaoning, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang and, to a lesser extent, Shandong. Only Sichuan (SW) and Hunan 
(Centre) are not on the coast among those that file more than one percent of patents. 
The Centre and the West of China are less innovative, with western provinces, such as 
Tibet and Qinghai, and central provinces, such as Ningxia, barely generating patent 
applications. 
 
In India, there seems to be little innovation – at least, as measured by patents – 
conducted outside the already mentioned innovation hubs of Mumbai, Delhi, 
Bangalore, Chennai, Hyderabad, or Pune. Some of the largest and most populated 
states of the North – Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, or Uttar Pradesh -  
conduct little innovation, reflecting the presence of less dynamic or even dying 
sectors and industries and complex, when not outright problematic political 
environments and industrial relations. But even there the situation is better than in the 
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‘seven sister’ states of the extreme North East, which are virtually innovation deserts. 
Some of these had no patents applications until 2007, including some relatively big 
states such as Assam (located in North East India, bordering Bhutan and Bangladesh). 
 
2.3 An increasing tendency towards the concentration of innovation. 
 
An important factor worth noting is that the geographical concentration of innovative 
activity in China and India shows no sign of abating. If anything, the agglomeration 
of innovation is increasing very rapidly, in particular in China. Patenting in India and 
China is far more spatially agglomerated than in the United States and, especially, 
Europe, where the distribution of patenting activity is more evenly spread across 
space. In addition, differential levels of investment in innovation inputs also appear to 
influence where innovative activity takes place. Top patenting regions in China 
account for a considerably larger share of innovative activity than those in India.  
 
However, rather than ‘maturing’ and following the same path as the US or the EU 
towards a more even geographical distribution of innovative activity, the pace of 
concentration of innovation has accelerated during the period of analysis. 
 
Figure 4. Cumulative Distribution of average PCT applications. Top 20 most 
innovative regions, 1994. 
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The comparison of figures 4 and 5 signals the evolution of the geographical 
dimension of innovation over the 1994-2007 period: Figure 4 refers to the situation in 
1994, whereas Figure 5 covers that in 2007. As already highlighted by Sun (2003), we 
find evidence of increasing spatial agglomeration of innovative activity in China since 
the 1990s, as measured by patents, which since 2000 outstrips that of China. Between 
1994 and 2000 innovative activity in India was far more concentrated than in China. 
The majority of Indian states did not generate any patents at the beginning of the 
period of analysis (only seven patent applications were filed in 1994 in India), 
meaning that all patenting activity was limited to two states (Figure 5). Innovation in 
China also exhibited at that time a high level of concentration in a limited number of 
provinces. This geographical agglomeration of innovation was far greater in China 
than in the US and, in turn, in the US than in the EU. By the late 1990s the pattern 
begins to change and by 2007 patenting is already more clustered in Chinese 
provinces than in Indian states (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5. Cumulative Distribution of average PCT applications. Top 20 most 
innovative regions, 2007. 
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The above-mentioned concentration of innovation activity across Chinese provinces 
and Indian states is reproduced in every sector considered. When the overall patent 
counts is broken down into technology fields, the resulting figures mimic the pattern 
already unveiled in previous figures. Figure 6 shows the spatial distribution of 
biotechnology patenting across the countries included in the analysis, for the whole 
time period 1994-2007. Although biotechnology patenting is somewhat more spatially 
agglomerated in China and India than overall patenting, the general trends are very 
similar (Figure 6). In China, the top three ‘biotech regions’ account for over 80% of 
overall patenting in the field. As with overall counts both countries have more 
concentrated biotech patenting activity than the USA – where the top three regions 
account for just over 30% of all biotech patents – and Europe.  
 
Figure 6. Cumulative Distribution of average PCT applications in Biotechnology. 
Top 20, 1994-2007.  
 
 
The same territorial patterns of innovation are reproduced for other technology fields, 
such as information and communications technology (ICT) and nanotechnology. In 
terms of ICT patents sectoral activity is once again more agglomerated in China than 
in India, with both countries having long tails of trailing regions. Again, both 
countries’ ICT patenting is much more spatially clustered than in the USA and in 
Europe. Only in innovation in Nanotechnology India is more territorially 
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agglomerated than China. The top three Indian regions account for over 80% of 
nanotech patenting, against an approximate 60% share for the leading Chinese 
regions. As with the other two industries, nanotech patenting in both of these 
countries is significantly more agglomerated than in the USA or in the EU.  
 
2.4 The spatial clustering of innovation inputs. 
 
The spatial analysis of innovation inputs unveils some interesting dynamics in the 
geography of innovation in the different contexts. Table 2 reproduces the ranking 
analysis for R&D spending (India, USA) and science and technology spending 
(China). Expenditure is weighted by population in order to give comparable measures 
of intensity for these innovation inputs.   
 
Patterns of agglomeration for R&D spending differ from those of patenting. For the 
USA, San Jose-San Francisco-Oakland is top of both league tables, but only three 
locations (San Jose-San Francisco-Oakland, Seattle-Tacoma-Olympia and Rochester-
Batavia-Seneca Falls) remain in the top ten regions. Thirteen locations appear on both 
counts in the top 20. Noticeably, Detroit-Warren-Flint is the second highest patenting 
region, but does not feature in the top 20 areas for R&D. 
 
Only three states appear in India’s top ten rankings in R&D and S&T technology 
intensity: Delhi, Haryana and Chandigarh, the top three locations for patenting, rank 
17
th
, 7
th
 and 4
th
 for R&D spending respectively. Five of China’s top 10 regions for 
science and technology also feature in the top 10 for patenting applications, and 
Shanghai and Beijing remain in the top three regions (Guangdong is 3
rd
 for patents 
but 17
th
 for science and technology intensity).  
 
 
Table 2. Top 5 regions in terms of R&D / science and technology intensity 
  China, R&D, 2007 India, R&D, 1994-
2006 
USA, BEA-EAs, Private  
R&D, 1994-2007 
 
1 Beijing 5.40 Uttaranchal 0.47 San Jose-San 
Francisco-
Oakland, CA 
(EA) 
(Not 
comparable - 
Ranking only) 
  
  17 
 
 
Table 3, below, gives rankings for human capital inputs – as measured by country 
population shares with tertiary education or above. The spatial distribution of human 
capital is different again from patenting and R&D spending. China’s territorial system 
is the most similar across inputs and outputs, with six of its top ten human capital 
regions also in the most innovative regions list. As with R&D spending, Beijing and 
Shanghai remain in the top three, in identical positions to their patents rankings.  
 
Four of India’s top human capital regions appear also in the ten most innovative 
regions lists, with Delhi and Chandigarh in the top three in both cases. There is 
substantial change in the rest of the top twenty. In the case of the USA, Washington-
Baltimore-Northern Virginia is the economic area with the highest share of graduates, 
but does not even feature in the top twenty patenting regions. This is largely explained 
by DC’s large community of graduates working in politics and public policy rather 
than sciences or high-tech manufacturing. Austin-Round Rock is a well-known US 
tech cluster with a large university, explaining its presence high up in the patents, 
R&D and human capital tables. Denver-Aurora-Boulder is the third highest region in 
terms of graduate population share, but again does not feature in the twenty highest-
2 Shanghai 2.52 Himachal 
Pradesh 
0.35 Detroit-Warren-
Flint, MI (EA) 
(Not 
comparable - 
Ranking only) 
  
3 Tianjin 2.27 Jammu & 
Kashmir 
0.21 New York-
Newark-
Bridgeport, NY-
NJ-CT-PA (EA) 
(Not 
comparable - 
Ranking only) 
  
4 Shaanxi 2.23 Chandigarh 0.16 Davenport-
Moline-Rock 
Island, IA-IL 
(EA) 
(Not 
comparable - 
Ranking only) 
  
5 Jiangsu 1.67 Punjab 0.15 Seattle-Tacoma-
Olympia, WA 
(EA) 
(Not 
comparable - 
Ranking only) 
  
         
 China: Intramural expenditure on R&D as percentage of regional GDP - China 
Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology 
 India: Combines  Central Government Extramural and State total expenditure in 
R&D as a percentage of regional GDP - R&D Statistics 
 
 
USA: Regional Private R&D Expenditure as a percentage of Regional Total Personal Income - Proxy for 
Ranking purposes only calculated from Compustat firm-level data 
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patenting regions. There is some movement in the rest of the table, but the set of 
regions remains largely the same.  
 
Table 3. Top 5 regions in terms of Tertiary Education achievements, 1994-2007 
  China,1995-2007 India, 1995-2006 USA, BEA-EAs, 1990 
& 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Beijing 0.20 Chandigarh 0.25 Washington-
Baltimore-
Northern 
Virginia, DC-
MD-VA-WV 
(EA) 
0.33 
2 Shanghai 0.14 Delhi 0.21 Austin-Round 
Rock, TX (EA) 
0.32 
3 Tianjin 0.10 Himachal 
Pradesh 
0.19 Denver-Aurora-
Boulder, CO 
(EA) 
0.31 
4 Xinjiang 0.07 Goa 0.16 San Jose- San 
Francisco-
Oakland, CA 
(EA) 
0.30 
5 Liaoning 0.07 Uttar 
Pradesh 
0.15 Boston-
Worcester-
Manchester, MA-
NH (EA) 
0.29 
China: People with college-level or higher degrees as a share of total provincial 
population (aged 6 and above) - China Statistical Yearbook, 1991-2008 
India: People with college, diploma or higher degrees  (in urban areas) as a share 
of total state population (aged 7 and above) - National Sample Survey 
USA: People with Bachelor’s degree and higher as a share of total BEA EA 
population (aged 25 and above) - USA Census Bureau Counties Data Files 
 
 
3. The drivers of the geography of innovation in China and India  
 
The analysis of the data has revealed a number of interesting trends and stylised facts. 
First that the traditional global hierarchy in terms of innovation capacity still persists. 
The USA remains the established world technology leader, comfortably 
outperforming the EU and still miles ahead of China and India, in R&D, R&D 
workforce, research quality and university-educated workforce population shares. But 
the gap between the innovative capacity of the developed world and these emerging 
countries, albeit still large, is closing fast. China and, to a lesser extent, India are 
setting the bases, in terms of innovation and human capital inputs, for the future 
generation of knowledge in a more competitive world. But the effort in R&D and 
human capital by these countries has been highly selective, favouring those centres 
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and sectors with a greater potential and contributing to the emergence of highly 
unbalanced geographies of innovation. The territorial polarisation of innovation in 
these countries is unprecedented and exceeds anything seen in the US and in the EU, 
where we have witnessed in recent decades some consolidation of the most dynamic 
innovation poles (Crescenzi et al. 2007). And the drive towards a greater territorial 
polarisation of innovation potential shows no sign of fading. 
 
What are the reasons behind, first, such a marked catch-up in innovation by China and 
India and, second, the highly unbalanced geographical nature of the innovation efforts 
in these two countries? The reasons for these developments can be found in the 
different innovation policies adopted by China and India and can be interpreted 
through the analytical lenses of the different theories which have dominated how we 
think about innovation in recent decades: the linear model of innovation, geographical 
analyses of knowledge spillovers, and the theories about institutions and (regional) 
systems of innovation. 
 
First, both India and China have adopted innovation strategies which can be directly 
extracted from the book of linear innovation and endogenous growth theories. The 
linear model of innovation (Bush 1945, Maclaurin 1953) posits a relatively simple 
path towards innovation: innovation is the direct outcome of putting greater resources 
in science and technology and human capital. The greater the investment in R&D, the 
greater the capacity of a country to innovate. Although starting from a different 
perspective, endogenous growth theories also highlight the importance of human 
capital, technology and knowledge in advancing the technological frontier. 
Subsequent productivity gains drive long-term growth rates (Romer 1990). In 
practice, national governments have tended to operationalise linear model innovation 
and endogenous growth ideas by seeking to raise overall levels of human capital and 
ideas production. As such, policy frameworks are effectively ‘national innovation 
system’ models promoting key innovative actors such as businesses, central 
government, universities and public research institutes (Liu and White 2001) – closely 
resembling the ‘national science systems’ explored by David Mowery and others 
(Mowery 1992, Mowery and Oxley 1995).  Analyses focus on countries’ performance 
on key inputs – R&D spending, human capital stock, university investment – and their 
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links to key outputs such as patenting rates and ‘gazelle’ firms, which approximate 
ideas generation and diffusion.   
 
The trajectories of China and India in this respect have by no means been completely 
similar. China not only has a more globalised economy. Its science and technology 
and innovation systems have also developed greater linkages to the rest of the world. 
China’s economic opening started timidly in 1978, with the creation of special 
enterprise zones and, by the time India was starting to think about the liberalisation of 
its economy in 1991, the networks between its economy and the rest of the world 
where on the verge of taking-off (Jian et al 1996, Liu and Buck 2007, Dahlman 2010). 
Consequently, China has benefited from greater intakes of FDI and inflows of foreign 
technology than the South Asian giant (Dahlman 2010). By contrast, until the 1991 
currency crisis forced an acceleration of economic liberalization, India’s development 
strategy had been largely autarkic, based on import substitution (Dahlman 2010). 
Since then the country has shifted from ‘highly regulated, autarkic’ development to 
more market-led models, with a further acceleration in the early 2000s (Gajwani et al. 
2006, Fleischer et al. 2010).  More than China, India has since been able to make a 
virtue of cultural and historical specificities in developing innovative capacity – most 
obviously the English language and democratic political institutions (Bound 2007, 
Bruche 2009).  
 
But, in terms of innovation, the similarities possibly outweigh the differences. China 
and India have not been shy of adopting national-level perspectives of innovation. 
Both countries have had a historic emphasis on technology-led national growth 
(Leadbeater and Wilsdon 2007). Historically, both India and China have used 
innovation and technology-led development to pursue national prestige / international 
positioning, for example via space flight and atomic weapons programmes 
(Leadbeater and Wilsdon 2007). The shift from heavily statist models of public 
policy, towards market-led reforms (Jian et al. 1996, Fan 2008, Fleischer et al. 2010) 
since the mid-1980s (China) to early 1990s (India) has not implied an abandonment of 
national frameworks for innovation. China and India continue to invest heavily in 
‘innovation inputs’, such as R&D and HE investment, while developing their 
domestic innovation capacities China (Lundin and Schwaag Serger 2007), which both 
feeds into and feeds from rapid macroeconomic growth.  
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The policy paths are similar but not necessarily the same. In 2006 China announced a 
‘Medium to Long Term Science and Technology Development Programme’. The 
main aim of this programme is to increase R&D spending from levels of 1.3% of 
GDP (in 2006) to 2.5% by 2020. This implies a sustained effort and growth rates in 
R&D in the range of 10 to 15% per year. India, in contrast, has been less vocal on the 
R&D front and concentrated more on the development of human capital and the 
clustering of scientific and technological activity in science parks (Mitra 2007). It has 
also sought to encourage the improvement of science and technology generation and 
innovative capacity by means of specific instruments, such as the increase of research 
grants for researchers and tax incentives and concessional loans for firms (Mani 
2004). The Indian government has also encouraged the emergence of venture capital 
in order to address some of the funding problems affecting innovative firms. 
Furthermore, India has also promoted the adoption of foreign technology in specific 
sectors, such as ICT (Dahlman 2010), while China has been keener on enhancing the 
capacity of domestic S&T sectors.  
 
The main drawback of linear models of innovation activity is that they pay minimal 
attention to space – and so do not explain why innovative activity is so spatially 
concentrated in China and India.  
 
The phenomenal level of concentration of innovative activities in China and India can 
therefore be explained by resorting to research on knowledge spillovers and the 
spatial dynamics of innovation. Different streams of literature bring space into the 
picture, by showing how agglomeration supports innovative activity, via localised 
knowledge spillovers (e.g. Jaffe et al. 1993, Audretsch and Feldman 1996, Malmberg 
et al. 1996, Acs et al. 2002, Carlino et al. 2007). As neither agglomeration nor 
innovation can be measured directly, density and patenting are typically used as 
proxies (as in the data presented in the previous section of the paper). Research on 
knowledge spillovers has put the emphasis on the fact that innovation does not diffuse 
costlessly in space. Indeed, analyses of innovation diffusion have tended to highlight 
the presence of relatively strong distance decay-effects. This has been found to be true 
in Europe (Moreno et al. 2005, Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi 2008), as well as in the 
US (Anselin et al. 1997, Varga 2000, Sonn and Storper 2008). Hence the combination 
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of economies of agglomeration, often linked to urbanisation, with high costs for the 
diffusion of innovation, point towards the fact that countries wanting to make a 
significant leap in the innovation capacity may be better off by geographically 
concentrating their innovation inputs. 
 
A number of studies suggest that proximity-spillover-innovation links also operate in 
developing country contexts, with strong evidence that urbanisation boosts productive 
efficiency (Scott and Garofoli 2007, Duranton 2008, Xu 2009). And China and India 
are no exceptions. Sustained national inputs into innovation, coupled with 
agglomeration and economic externalities have been key for the rapid emergence of 
cities such as Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore or Hyderabad as innovation hubs in India, 
and to the prevalence of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou or Shenzhen as the centres of 
innovation activity in China. Most indicators point towards the fact that these 
dynamic innovation poles suck large resources from neighbouring areas, while so far 
providing limited evidence of a large-scale diffusion of the knowledge being 
generated there. Both in China and India backwash innovation effects seem to still 
clearly prevail over spread effects. However, the dimension and evolution of 
backwash innovation effects may be constrained by the very pace of urbanisation 
which is driving them. Specifically, rapid or chaotic urbanisation can outstrip 
governments’ ability to provide adequate infrastructure and public services (Venables 
2005, Cohen 2006). As such, agglomerations are also strongly correlated with poverty 
and informal development and may undermine future innovative capacity. 
 
Path dependency is another factor explaining the uneven geography of innovation. 
This is particularly evident in the case of India, which has tended to suffer less of the 
historical upheavals – at least in terms of the location of innovation and industrial 
activity – than China. Maharashtra’s success has been partially built on an old 
concentration of pharmaceutical industries and on the industrial hubs in Mumbai-
Pune-Nasik. Mumbai has also benefited from the presence of prestigious research 
institutes, such as the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) or the Indian 
Institute of Technology (IIT).  The states in the south also enjoyed historical 
comparative advantages, such as the presence of an old hub of auto components in 
Tamil Nadu or some of the top Indian engineering schools in Karnataka. Gujarat in 
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the west has built its innovation capacity on the back of a dynamic entrepreneurial 
class. 
 
 Inadequate institutional capacity may also become another important barrier in the 
drive towards innovation in these countries. Country- and locality-specific factors – 
history, institutions, networks and norms – have an important influence over 
innovation outcomes and have played an important role in the development of the 
literatures on institutions and systems of innovation (Freeman 1987; Lundvall et al. 
2009). ‘Regional innovation systems’ (RIS) localise and spatialise these frameworks 
to specific regions and clusters (Piore and Sabel 1984, Saxenian 1994, Cooke et al 
1997, Storper 1997 Cooke 2002, Asheim and Gertler 2005). The central insight is that 
proximity facilitates innovation, or as Asheim and Gertler (2005: 309-310) suggest, 
‘the geographic configuration of economic agents … is fundamentally important in 
shaping the innovative capabilities of firms and industries’.  RIS analysis heavily 
focuses on firms and firms’ capabilities. Specific regional factors such as the presence 
of universities and public agencies, networks and institutions determine, in 
conjunction with the national level factors and institutions, the economic performance 
of individual firms and local actors. The interactions within RIS between the private 
sector, the public sector and universities conform a ‘triple helix’ of relationships 
(Cooke 2002) at the heart of the success (or lack of it) of individual innovation 
systems.  
 
RIS may not work in exactly the same way in emerging countries (e.g. Scott and 
Garofoli 2007, Lundvall et al. 2009 and Padilla-Pérez et al. 2009). First, large sections 
of local innovative systems in China and India rely, to a much greater extent than in 
developed countries, on informal activities and even the informal sector. The 
institutional framework and social capital on which these systems rely are therefore 
shaped in a different way from what has been described in the developed world 
(Lundvall et al. 2009). Second, China and India’s systems have evolved much more 
rapidly as a consequence – especially in China – of the rapid emergence of the 
country and of the insertion of innovative actors into global production chains (Mitra 
2007, Bruche 2009, Yeung 2009). Third, such international ascent has happened in 
the absence of robust, stable and high quality institutions which are generally deemed 
to be essential in order to generate greater innovation, productivity and economic 
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growth, generating the ‘puzzle’ of trying to explain the rapid development of 
innovation in weak institutional conditions (Saxenian and Sabel, 2008).  
 
Unlike innovation systems in developed countries, formal institutions are weak in 
countries such as China and India, especially at regional level. Intellectual property 
regimes provide only partial coverage and public agencies that may not always be 
welfare-maximising (Altenburg 2009, Joseph 2009). Capital and finance is often 
limited, and university-industry collaborations more limited, with universities simply 
acting as suppliers of human capital (of varying quality), rather than of direct 
innovation-generating knowledge (Padilla-Pérez et al. 2009).  
 
All of these factors place constraints on the ability of firms and economic 
organisations in China and India to develop new products and services – and limit 
managers’ incentives to collaborate with other firms (Altenburg 2009). In this context, 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) become crucial providers of both capital flows (via 
FDI) and new technologies (via alliances / collaborations and spillovers) (Cantwell 
2005). More than half of global R&D is currently done within multinational 
enterprises; in 2007 Toyota ($8.4bn) and GM ($8.1bn) each spent more on R&D than 
India (Dahlman 2010). And in China and India multinational firms’ location patterns 
closely follow those of patents, and vice versa. Between 60-80% of all MNEs in India 
and China are concentrated in Beijing and Shanghai and in the Bangalore, Pune, Delhi 
axis, respectively (Bruche 2009). 
 
Scarce or inadequate innovation agents, limited capacity to collaborate among firms, 
and a limited presence of multinational firms in inland China and in north eastern 
India thus represent insurmountable barriers for the development of innovative 
capacity in these areas. If we add inadequate institutions on top, it is not surprising 
that agglomeration and regional systems of innovation reinforce one another in order 
to create a very uneven and territorially unbalanced geography of innovation in China 
and in India. 
 
In these conditions, export markets and trade entry points become an important source 
of knowledge exchange and innovation; and the Chinese and Indian nation-states (and 
national policy frameworks) are, by the implementation of all sorts of different 
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policies, contributing to the reinforcement of existing innovation hubs to possibly a 
greater extent than local efforts (Padilla-Pérez et al. 2009). ‘Discretionary public 
policies’ in national development strategies are critical (Cimoli et al. 2009). 
Moreover, large cities and trade entry points in China and India have become the 
gateways for diaspora migrants and trans-national communities in facilitating 
innovation, by spreading ideas, developing globalised production systems and 
influencing institutional reform in ‘home’ countries (Saxenian 2006, Saxenian and 
Sabel 2008) further aggravating the internal gap between innovative and non-
innovative territories.  
 
These developments combine themes from research on how the changes in global 
innovation networks have affected emerging countries (e.g. Mowery 2001). 
According to Archibugi and Iammarino (2002), the innovative success of emerging 
countries has tended to rely not only on how well individual countries managed to 
internationalise and exploit local innovations, but also on how much knowledge and 
technology was transferred by multinational corporations and on the extent to which 
local firms have been able and capable of branching into global scientific and 
technology networks. In all these areas both China and India, albeit following very 
different paths, have been successful on all three counts. They both have managed to 
absorb knowledge and know-how from MNEs and to create a number of  ‘lead firms’ 
capable of not only engaging and competing with leading firms elsewhere in the 
world, but also of developing the all-important local networks through which 
knowledge and innovation are distributed within clusters and then diffused across 
different parts of the country (Yeung 2009).  All these processes are at the origin of 
the very uneven geography of innovation observed in both China and India and shown 
by the data discussed in the previous section of this paper. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper has presented a first view into the geography of innovation in China and 
India, comparing it with that of developed spaces in the world, namely the US and the 
EU. 
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The picture which emerges from the analysis is one of countries still significantly 
lagging in terms of innovation capacity, but which are also setting the bases for 
sustained and rapid catch-up in the endogenous generation of innovation. The 
impressive rate of convergence in recent years – albeit from very low initial levels – 
are possibly just a sign of what is likely to happen in years to come: two countries 
rapidly rising up the ranks of the world science and technology and innovation 
hierarchy which are developing innovation systems which are different from what is 
the norm in the developed world. In this respect, Jacques’ (2012) prophecy that 
Chinese – and Indian – modernity will be very different from Western modernity is 
being reproduced in terms of the spatial organisation of the  innovation systems of 
these two countries. 
 
The innovation effort in both China and India is, however, far from uniform and 
sustained in by what all standards are very uneven geographies of innovation. 
National innovation strategies and policies, galloping urbanisation, and uneven 
institutional capacities across regions in China and India are combining in order to 
create innovation ‘mountains’ in large urban areas next to ‘deserts’ where innovation 
capacity is virtually absent. The location of FDI and multinationals in these 
‘mountains’ further contributes to the emergence of self-reinforcing virtuous cycles of 
innovation in selected metropolises and trade entry hubs such as Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen in China, or Delhi, Mumbai, Hyderabad and Bangalore in 
India. Picking winners is further contributing to this mounting territorial imbalance. 
The innovation ‘mountains’ are complemented by ‘deserts’ where not only virtually 
no innovation takes place – i.e. the ‘seven sister’ states of North Eastern India or 
numerous provinces in the West of China – but where existing conditions are unlikely 
to trigger any sort of innovative surge in the near future. In fact, the lack of a critical 
mass of innovative actors, coupled with national policies of picking winners and with 
the advantages of economics of agglomeration and trade access for the generation and 
diffusion of knowledge are likely to perpetuate what is already a very uneven, and 
perhaps unsustainable, geography of innovation in the two main emerging countries 
of the world. 
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